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NOTARIZED WILLS
ANNE-MARIE RHODES*

In 2008, the Uniform Law Commission amended the Uniform
Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC").' Those amendments primarily
2
focused on the intestacy rights of children of assisted reproduction. A
lesser-known amendment to the UPC permitted a notarized will as an
option to the traditional witnessed will.3 In the five years since the
2008 changes, several states have considered the changes, but only
Colorado and North Dakota have enacted the notarized will option.4
The addition of the notarized will as an express choice for one of the
three traditional will execution formalities is a totally new concept
that may undermine the progressive reach of the UPC.
I.

THE WILL FORMALITIES MATRIX: RULES AND EXCEPTIONS

American probate law has shown remarkable uniformity and
stability in what are considered the three basic execution formalities:
that a will be in writing, signed by the testator, and witnessed. The
similarity is commonly attributed to the deep roots of our common-law
history; in particular to the English Statute of Wills of 1540,' the

* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author is grateful to the
participants in the Oklahoma City University School of Law conference, Wills, Trusts and
Estates Meet Gender, Race and Class, held on September 28, 2013; in particular, to
conference organizer Carla Spivack, William P. LaPiana, and Bridget Crawford. The author
also acknowledges the research assistance of Sarah Ferguson, the assistance of Heather
Figus, and the support of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Faculty Research
Fund.
1 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC L. J. 83, 83
(2008).
2 Id. at 83 n.1.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (1969) (amended 2008).
4 See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502(1)(c)(II) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-0802(1)(c)(2) (2009).
5 See generally 3 Statutes of the Realm 744, 744-46 (1540).
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English Statute of Frauds of 1677,6 and the English Wills Act of
1837.' The general stability of these execution requirements is likely
due to the legal purposes they serve. Taken together, these three
formalities are commonly understood to serve four functions:8 the
ritual function, 9 the evidentiary function,o the protective function, 1'
and the channeling function.12

6 See generally The Statute of Frauds of 1677, 29 Car. II., ch. 3 (1676).

7 See generally Wills Act of 1837, 7 Win. 4 & 1 Vict. ch. 26, 217 (1837).
8 Classification of Gratuitous Transfers is the leading article categorizing the functions of
See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson,
the traditional wills formalities.
Classificationof GratuitousTransfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941). The authors listed three such
functions, namely the ritual function, the evidentiary function, and the protective function.
Id. at 5-9. Professor John Langbein extended the channeling function, a well-recognized
concept in the law of contracts, as a fourth function for the wills formalities. See John
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493-94 (1975).
Other functions have also been suggested. Professor Peter M. Tiersma suggests a
"textualizing" function. See generally PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT, PAPER, PIXELS: LAW
AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF COMMUNICATION

(2010).

"The formalities of execution take

ordinary words and transform them into authoritative text. . . . the writing is not just
another piece of evidence of an underlying oral event, . . . it becomes the event itself." Id. at
60. Others have noted an expressive function, observing that viewing testation through a
singular lens of property transmission ignores testation's self-expressive function, and that
recent changes to trust law meant to bolster economic efficiency do so at the expense of
testamentary freedom. See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 66-67
(2012). A therapeutic function is also present, as wills formalities in the estate planning
process may serve to promote the psychological well-being of the testator. See Mark Glover,
The TherapeuticFunction of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 142 (2012). A
family protection function may be seen to exist in the tradition of requiring strict execution
formalities but a less rigorous standard for revocation, thereby protecting the traditional

family. Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal Revocation: Manifestation of Probate's
Family ProtectionFunction, 34 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 411, 431-40 (2009).
9 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 8, at 5. The ritual function addresses a court's basic
concern: "to be convinced that the statements of the transferor were deliberately intended to
effectuate a transfer." Id. at 3. By requiring "the performance of some ceremonial for the
purpose of impressing the transferor with the significance of his statements", a court can
justify a conclusion of deliberate intent. Id. at 4.
1o The evidentiary function, of all the wills execution formalities, "may increase the
reliability of the proof presented to the court." Id. at 4. Gulliver and Tilson deemed the
evidentiary function especially important in wills scenarios as the transferor is deceased
and there may be a lengthy time lag between the will's execution and its probate. Id. at 6.
The writing requirement provides permanence, the signature signals finality, and "[t]he
important requirement that (the) . . . will be attested . .. has great evidentiary significance.

It affords some opportunity to secure proof of the facts of execution." Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 8, at 8.
" The protective function serves "the stated prophylactic purpose of safeguarding the
testator, at the time of the execution of the will, against undue influence or other forms of
imposition." Id. at 4-5. Gulliver and Tilson viewed the protective function as "difficult to
justify under modern conditions," and "not sufficiently important in the present era . .
Id. at 9-10.
12 The channeling function for wills recognizes that "[c]ompliance with the Wills Act
formalities . . . results in considerable uniformity in the organization, language, and
content" for wills, thereby simplifying a court's determination that the decedent knew and
intended the document to be his will. Langbein, supra note 8, at 494.
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Yet, the path of will formalities was neither linear nor
uniform. There have been, and continue to be, exceptions to each of
these three basic formalities.13
The tenacious persistence of
exceptions to the basic will formalities is a tangible recognition, as
Holmes has observed, that the life of the law "has not been logic, it
has been experience."l4
In thinking about how to construct any legal system, including
how to dispose of a decedent's property at death, it is hardly
surprising that the systemic desire for clear and certain rules might
conflict with a just resolution in a particular case.' 5 Life is not neat
and tidy, and people, even careful people, fall short. Equitable
principles seek to limit the unjustness of strict application of rules,
often by insisting that one's acts are to be interpreted in line with
one's intent.' 6
In the context of controversies over will formalities, however,
the statutorily-required acts were heavily weighted, to the virtual
exclusion of intent. For judges, the specter of fraud and manipulation
of vulnerable people would hang heavy over their decisions due to the
simple reality that the decedent is no longer present to confirm his
intent to the court.' 7 Consequently, one's act of signing a will before
disinterested witnesses was deemed confirmatory of one's
testamentary intent and volition.' 8
Even with this act-heavy predisposition, however, commonlaw exceptions to each of the basic formalities, often grounded in
equity, were well-recognized. In essence, there were two approaches
13 See infra text accompanying notes 19-45.
14 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
Is The rules and standards, and formalities and formalism, discussion has been extensive in
the academic literature and in the particular context of wills and trusts law. See generally
Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for
Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, n.1 (2002)
(for a representative listing of significant articles in that discussion).
16 One example in the wills context is the requirement of a testator having animus testandi
despite there being no such stated requirement in the execution formalities statute. See
Lister v. Smith, 164 Eng. Rep. 1282, 1284 (1863) where the court refused probate for a
codicil where it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the testator executed the
codicil without any intent to have it function as a codicil. See id. at 1285-86.
17 See In re Pavlinko's Estate, 148 A.2d 528, 531 (1959); see also Gulliver & Tilson, supra
note 8, at 8. The court in Pavlinko, over a vigorous dissent, refused probate when a
husband and wife each mistakenly signed the will prepared for the other, noting that "[olnce
a Court starts to . . . make exceptions to clear, plain and unmistakable provisions of the
Wills Act . . . to accomplish equity and justice . . . , the Wills Act will become a meaningless,

although well intentioned, scrap of paper, and the door will be opened wide to countless
fraudulent claims. . . ." Pavlinko, 148 A.2d at 531.
H See Lister, 164 Eng. Rep. at 1286. In Lister, the hard question was whether the court
should have heard any evidence regarding lack of testamentary intent when the codicil was
duly executed in point of form. Id. at 1285.
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to wills-a formal process and another less formal one.
A. In Writing
Writing requires literacy; but for much of early common-law
history illiteracy was the norm.19 Consequently, all legal transactions
had oral traditions, including wills. 2 0 In Anglo-Saxon times, for
example, a testator spoke of his death-time property transfers before
witnesses. 21 When a written copy existed, it was often seen as a
record of the oral transaction. 22 It was not an operative or dispositive
document on its own. 2 3 Over time, as literacy became more common,
the oral act became secondary to the written act, and then nearly
displaced it altogether. 24
One remnant of this oral tradition remains in the statutory
law in less than half of U.S. jurisdictions. 2 5 For those in extremis 26 or

1 TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 50, 56 (noting that the Anglo-Saxons were "mostly illiterate,"
while after the Norman Conquest of 1066, "people grew increasingly comfortable with
literacy .. . written records started to proliferate").
20 TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 51. "During the early Anglo-Saxon period, therefore, legal
transactions would have been entirely oral. This situation began to change ... around the
year 600 .... Before long, written compilations of laws began to appear. Not too much later
we begin to see charters, wills, writs, and other legal documents." Id.
21 See id. at 52.
22 See id. at 52. "There are a number of indications that Anglo-Saxon wills were merely
records of oral transactions." Id. Tiersma notes that the primary meaning of the Old
English word for a will is "to speak." TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 52. Also there was "no
signature or seal or other type of authentication." Id. Moreover the names of witnesses
were included in the document. Id. Most importantly, linguistic evidence supports the oral
tradition; for example, "[h]ere in this document it is declared how the [person] ... declared
his will... ." Id.
23 Id. at 52.
24 Id. at 55-56. "Although the historical details are complex, the English law of wills came to
require that the performative or dispositive act, which in the past consisted of the speaking
of certain words, should now consist of writing those words. The text was no longer just a
record of an oral will. It was now the will itself." TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 56. "A person's
will is no longer what is in his mind or in the memories of witnesses, but a text that has
been formally executed by being signed, acknowledged, and witnessed." Id. at 57.
25 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 148, n.3 (9th ed.
2013) ("Today a bit fewer than half the states permit nuncupative (oral) wills . . ."); but cf.
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 364 (2d ed. 1953) ("Statutes in the
majority of our states allow oral will[s] . . . ."); see also Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G.

Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to Join the Digital Revolution?, 33
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 865, 873-75 (2007).
26 See IND. CODE § 29-1-5-4 (2013) (only for a person in imminent peril of death who
actually dies from that impending peril, with an amount not to exceed $1,000, but $10,000 if
in active military war service); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-608 (2013) ("in the last sickness");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-15 (2014) (requiring the will to be made at the testator's home
during the last illness); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.340 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.5 (2012);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-106 (2014) (similar to Indiana); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.025
(2013).
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27
for soldiers and sailors in military service, there is the limited
possibility of an oral, or nuncupative, will. This exception to the
writing requirement has an ancient common-law history. 28 Its
applicability is modest as it is limited qualitatively to those in
extreme circumstances or in the military, and often quantitatively to
small amounts, such as one thousand dollars. 2 9 The exception is most
likely an historic anomaly that is harmless in today's practice. 30 The
oral will is not expressed as a choice; rather, it is a separately stated
exception, available in limited circumstances, to the basic writing
requirement for a formal will.3 1

B. Signature by Testator
The act of signing is the testator's formal signaling of assent to
the written will as the final expression of his dispositive wishes. 32
Without the testator's signature, the written will is no more than a
draft; a tentative expression of dispositive wishes. If the testator did
not sign, the will would fail. 34

27 See W. VA. CODE § 41-1-5 (2014).
28 See The Statute of Frauds supra note 6, at sec. XIX (allowing for nuncupative wills for
those in their "last sickness,"); but see W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
at
available
(1765),
501
32,
ch.
2,
Book
ENGLAND,
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstonelbla-232.htm (noting that the requirements for
oral wills were "so numerous" that they had "fallen into disuse."); see also ATKINSON, supra
note 25, at 368-74 (a brief history of soldiers' and sailors' wills, starting with Julius Caesar).
29 See IND. CODE § 29-1-5-4 (2013) (with a $1,000 limitation, raised to $10,000 if in active
military service); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6 (2013) (with a $200 limit).
3o The UPC does not provide for oral wills. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (1969) (amended
2010). "The Uniform Probate Code does not allow oral wills, and its liberal choice-of-law
rule only applies to 'written' wills." WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ,
PRINCIPLES OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 113 (2005).

Within the last two decades, some

states have repealed their oral wills statutes. Georgia repealed its nuncupative statute
effective 1998. See Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia'sNew Probate Code, 13
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 670 (1997). Texas repealed its nuncupative statute effective
September 1, 2007. See GERRY BEYER, TEXAS PROBATE CODE WITH COMMENTARY 48-49
at
available
2013),
(revised
See MASS.
www.professorbeyer.com/EstatesCode/TexasProbateCode_(08-19-2013).pdf.
GEN. LAWS ch. 191 § 6 (repealed 2012). Nevada now provides that "[a] nuncupative or oral
will is not valid." NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.100 (1999).
31 See e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-608 (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. §91-5-15 (2014).
32 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 8, at 5-6.
33 SUSAN GARY ET AL, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 450 (2011)

(The signature "serves to distinguish the final will from a preliminary draft, an incomplete
document or simply notes.. . .").
34 See Allen v. Dalk, 826 So. 2d 245, 248 (Fla. 2002) ("While it is probable that the decedent
read the will and intended to sign her name, this Court has no way of knowing why she did
not do so, nor do we know that the will properly reflects her testamentary intent."). In those
jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC's Harmless-Error Rule, whether a will must
contain the testator's signature is now a new question. For example, in In re Probate of Will
and Codicil of Macool, 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), the New Jersey
Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the unreviewed and unsigned document
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Or, rather, it would fail with one notable exception. The law
has long provided that a will signed by another person, at the
testator's request and in the testator's presence, would be deemed
valid.3 ' This exception for a proxy signature is presumably a common
law and common sense response to a circumstance found throughout
history-someone unable to sign either due to physical infirmity or
illiteracy. 36 Proxy signature is provided for in the same section that
requires the testator's signature.3 7 It is not expressed as an exception,
nor is there an express limitation on the proxy signing to a testator
who is unable to sign. Nevertheless, like the oral will, proxy signing
has an established common-law history, and though not expressly
limited to those testators who are unable to write their names, it is
was not admissible as Mrs. Macool's will because the decedent lacked the opportunity to
review the document. Macool, 3 A.3d at 1265. Significantly, however, the Appellate

Division "in the interest of completeness" addressed the trial court's determination that,
under the Harmless-Error Rule, the testator must have signed the document. Id. The three
judge panel disagreed with the trial court: "we are satisfied that a writing offered under
N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3 need not be signed by the testator in order to be admitted to probate." Id.
at 1266. One participating judge has subsequently expressed reservation. In re Estate of
Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (Skillman, J.A.D., dissenting)
("Although I was on the panel that decided Macool, upon further reflection I have concluded
that that opinion gives too expansive an interpretation to N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3; specifically, I
disagree with the dictum that seems to indicate a draft will that has not been either signed
by the decedent or attested to by the witnesses can be admitted to probate . . . ."). On the
other hand, some states that have adopted the Harmless-Error Rule have modified the UPC
language to require the testator's signature on the proffered document. California, for
example, included the language "at the time the testator signed the will, the testator
intended the will to constitute the testator's will." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West
2008). The legislature may have presumed that the testator's signature serves as the best
evidence of the testator's intent. See generally Peter T. Wendel, California Probate Code
Section 6110(C)(2): How Big Is the Hole in the Dike?, 41 Sw. L. REV. 387, 401-04 (2012). In
adopting the Harmless-Error Rule, references to other countries' experiences with a
dispensing power were cited. One such country was Israel. Recent amendments to Israeli
law may weaken support for an expansive interpretation of the Harmless-Error Rule. See
Samuel Flaks, Excusing Harmless Error in Will Execution: The Israeli Experience, 3 EST.
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L. J. 27, 43-45 (2010). What constitutes the testator's signature is a
separate question. See Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W. 3d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that a computer generated cursive signature was acceptable as the testator's signature).
3 The Statute of Frauds of 1677, supra note 6, sec. V ("all devises ... shall be ... signed by
the party . . . or by some other person in his presence and by his express directions . . . .");
Wills Act of 1837, 1 Vict., ch. 26, sec 9 ("no Will shall be valid unless ... it shall be signed..
... by the Testator, or by some other Person in his Presence and by his Direction." Fortyeight states specifically provide by statute for proxy signature. See EUNICE L. Ross &
THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 5:3 (2d ed. 2013). Neither Connecticut nor Louisiana
was listed, but Louisiana does provide for proxy signature for one who is unable to sign. See
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1578 (1999).
36 See Welch v. Kirby, 255 F. 451, 453 (8th Cir. 1918) (a blind testator's will was upheld
where her signature was by proxy "because she could not do so").
3 See, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(2) (1969) (amended 2010) ("signed by the testator or
in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by
the testator's direction.").
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most likely so limited in practice.
C. Witnessed
From the beginning, the common law system required
witnesses to a will.3 9 When wills were oral, the witnesses' role was
evidentiary. When the decedent died, they were called to repeat what
the decedent had spoken to them. 4 0 When wills became written,
witnesses were retained to attest the testator's signing, capacity,
intent, and freedom from undue influence and duress at the time of
the will's execution. 4 1 A will that was not witnessed was fatally
flawed.42

3 See Muhlbauer v. Muhlbauer, 686 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App. 1985) (refused probate for a will
of a blind decedent when his third wife guided his hand in signing). The proffered document
would have substituted his wife for his children as sole beneficiary. Id. at 377. There was
"no believable testimony" that the decedent had requested assistance; but there was
evidence that the decedent had the physical ability to smoke and use his watch. Id. at 377.
39 The Statute of Frauds of 1677, supra note 6, sec V ("and shall be attested and subscribed
in the presence of the said devisor by three or four credible witnesses . . . ."); Wills Act of
1837, 1 Vict., ch. 26, sec 9 ("in the Presence of Two or more Witnesses present at the same
Time, and such Witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the Will in the Presence of the
Testator . . . ."); but cf. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1994) (sole U.S. exception to the witness
requirement for formal wills, requiring only that the will be in writing and signed at the end
by the testator).
40 See TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 52 (noting that the witnesses' "function was to remember
the contents of the testator's will, on the basis of what the testator said.").
41 See id. at 55 ("By the end of the [13th] century, wills were being read in court. And the
function of witnesses was also evolving: they were increasingly being questioned about the
authenticity of the seal . ... Witnesses were being demoted to guarantors of the authenticity
of the document."). What "attested" means in the witness requirement has been a source of
debate with varying interpretations:
While the word attestation is sometimes used to include the subscription
of the witness's name, it is not so used in the English statutes. Surely to
attest connotes more than merely to sign. Indeed the strict meaning of
the two words is quite different. To attest means to bear witness, or to
see and hear as distinguished from signing. To what must the witness
bear witness? The Statute of Frauds clearly indicates that it is the will
which must be attested. It does not give any further clue, however, as to
how this may be done. Possibly the English Wills Act also so intends,
although it certainly is subject to the construction that it is the testator's
signature rather than the will which is to be attested. The latter statute
makes up for the ambiguity in part by reciting certain details of the
execution, which bear on the matter of attestation.
ATKINSON, supra note 25, at 321-22. Atkinson also posits that a witness's attestation
must include the intent to be a witness, the animus attestandi:
Whether or not attestation includes the idea of subscription, it surely
connotes something more than the physical acts of signing or seeing.
Attestation is, in part at least, a state of mind . . . . Regardless of what it

is that is attested, the witnesses must intend to act as witnesses, or the
will is not valid.
Id. at 330-31.
42 Id. at 310 ("It should be noticed that the requirement of attesting witnesses is a provision
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Or perhaps it was not fatal, if it qualified as a holographic
will-that is, a will that was written and signed wholly in the
handwriting of the testator.4 3 The traditional rationale is that a will
that is proven to be wholly in the handwriting of the testator is
sufficient protection against fraud.4
Holographic wills are an
exception to the written will requirement in slightly more than half of
U.S. jurisdictions. 45 This exception may be set forth in a separate
section 4 6 or, in newer UPC-based versions, in a separate subsection
within the wills formalities section.47
II.

FITTING THE NOTARIZED WILL INTO THE FORMALITIES
MVATRIX

With these formalities, rules, and exceptions as background,
this article will focus on a very narrow issue: does making the
notarized will a choice within the basic wills formalities section rather
than an exception to those formalities carry any significance for wills
formalities? In other words, does placement matter?48 At first blush,
of the substantive law. Without witnesses, the will is invalid."); but cf., 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2502 (1994).
43 See generally R.H. Helmholz, The Origin of Holographic Wills in English Law, 15 J.
The traditional written-wholly-in-the-testator's-hand
LEGAL HIST. 97, 97 (1994).
requirement had been relaxed in some states. Now some statutes require only that "the
signature and the material provisions" be in the testator's handwriting, while others provide
for "the signature and the material portions." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 (1999); see also Richard Lewis Brown, The Holographic
Problem-The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 108 (2006) ("The
official comment ... suggests that the seemingly insignificant change from material
'provisions' in the old UPC to material 'portions' in the new UPC is intended to have real
significance."). Moreover, as the amount of handwriting decreases, the evidence proving or
disproving the testator's authorship becomes less reliable and persuasive.
" See Helmholz, supranote 43, at 97; Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 8, at 13-14. Some
statutes make specific reference to establishing the handwriting of the testator. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (1949) ("may be established by the evidence of at least three
(3) credible disinterested witnesses to the handwriting and signature of the testator . .
see VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-403(B) (2013) (requiring proof of testator's handwriting and
signature "by at least two disinterested witnesses").
45 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 25, at 197 (map showing 27 holographic wills states
in 2012); Brown, supra note 43, at 94 (noting that the number of states authorizing
holographic wills has increased over the last half century); Stephen Clowney, In Their Own
Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR &
EST. L.J. 27, 62 (2008) (analyzing holographic wills offered for probate in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania during a two year period, 1990 and 1995, and concluding "that all state
legislatures should consider adopting statutes that authorize the probate of holographic
wills").
46 E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 54 (2013); but see Oklahoma S.B. 1070, 1st Sess, 54th Leg.
2013 (proposing that holographic wills be notarized); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (2014);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-105 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-113 (2013).
47 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(b) (1969) (amended 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-0802 (2-502) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (1993).
48 Wendel, supra note 34, at 399 (making a placement argument regarding the scope of the
new California holographic wills legislation).
That argument, however, is more
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this does seem like a niggling, angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-a-pin
type of question, but the notarized will-structured as a choice within
the basic will formalities-signals the UPC's march towards
eliminating witness attestation altogether. 4 9 Four reasons suggest
this.
First, offering a clear and visible choice suggests that the
particular requirement is not deemed as important to the law as the
other two non-choice requirements. While choice may be seen as a
welcome measure of flexibility, merely having a choice suggests the
requirement is not as firm or as important to the law as nonnegotiable requirements. It weakens the requirement. In a larger
sense, it also weakens the other formalities. Individually assessing
the need for any one formality, whether it be writing, signature, or
witnesses, a case can be made for the elimination of each such
requirement. The strength of the traditional formalities and the
functions they serve come largely from viewing them jointly, taking
them together. In short, the whole is greater than the sum of the
parts.
Second, in deciding which choice to select, a testator could
logically ask which is easier to do. On a purely visual basis, the
statutory choice is compelling: forty-one words in seven lines for the
traditional witnessed will compared to seventeen words in four lines
for the notarized will. More directly, the requisite statutory act for
the notarized will is actually that of the testator's, the will is to be
"acknowledged by the testator before a notary public."o Presumably,
the evidence of that acknowledgement would be the notary's signature
and seal. In the case of the traditional will, the required act is that

grammatical and linguistic than strategic.
49 James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541
(1990) (the seminal article directly attacking the attestation requirement). In making his
case for abolition, Professor Lindgren argues, in part, from the UPC amendments that
eliminated the "disinterested" requirement for witnesses: "The official comments are almost
too persuasive for their purpose. In undercutting the disinterested witness requirement,
they have unwittingly undercut the witness requirement altogether. Once the attestation
requirement has been gutted, it should no longer be mandatory." Id. at 562; see also Adam
J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1057, 1075-76 (1996). For more
recent support in favor of abolishing attestation, see Clowney, supra note 45, at 62; and Reid
Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 877, 880 (2012) ("If inheritance law is committed to testamentary freedom, then the
will-making process must be rendered universally accessible . . . . In particular, transaction
costs should be lowered by eliminating the need for legal draftsmanship and witness
attestation."). For an intermediate position, see Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis
of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 891 (2012) (noting that "[t]he
continuing relevance of attestation thus depends to a certain extent on predictions about
how testators, potential wrongdoers, and others are likely to act if attestation were
abolished").
50 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (1969) (amended 2010).
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With a
the will is to be "signed by at least two individuals."'
notarized will, the testator can be the sole actor; with the traditional
will, the acts of others are statutorily required. The advantage of ease
favors notarized wills over witnessed wills.
Third, by offering a choice, testators can fairly assume that
whatever the purpose of the statute is, it can be achieved by either
option. This makes one wonder what the purpose of the requirement
is. The historic purposes of the witness requirement to a written will
are seen as fulfilling all the functions of the will formalities.5 2 Having
to gather together witnesses suggests a seriousness of purpose on the
testator's part; and the witnesses having to attest to the testator's
capacity, intent, and freedom from undue influence and duress at the
time provides some protection against fraud. 53
Witnesses are
essentially the public interface for this private transaction, deemed
structurally important because of the time lag between a will's
execution and the will's operation. 5 4

s" Id. § 2-502(a)(3)(A).
52 Lindgren, supra note 49, at 554

("although attestation serves all the purposes of
formalities," the main purpose is the protective function.) However, it is important not to
discount the ongoing significance of the ritual and the evidentiary functions for witnesses.
See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 8, at 5 ("Compliance with the total combination of
requirements for the execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value .... ). As
for the evidentiary function:
The provision .. . that the will be signed or acknowledged by the testator
in the presence of the attesting witnesses may be justified as having
some evidentiary purpose in requiring a definitive act of the testator to
be done before the witnesses, thus enabling them to testify ... that the
will was intended to be operative.
Id. at 8-9.
53 While there may be technical ambiguity in what attestation requires, the modern view
provides a robust view of what it is that a witness is attesting. See supra text accompanying
note 41. The self-proved will sanctioned by UPC § 2-504 provides a model affidavit form
that includes references to the testator's intent, capacity, and freedom from duress and
undue influence:
(name), the witnesses, sign our
(name),
We,
names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare
to the undersigned authority that the testator signs and executes this
instrument as (his)(her) will and that (he)(she) signs it willingly (or
willingly directs another to sign for (his)(her)), and that each of us, in
the presence and hearing of the testator, hereby signs this will as
witness to the testator's signing, and that to the best of our knowledge
the testator is [18] years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no
constraint or undue influence.
[Witness]
[Witness]
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504(a) (1969) (amended 2010).
54 See Gulliver & Tilson, supranote 8, at 3.
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Does an acknowledgement before a notary serve the same
ritual and protective functions? The Supreme Court has categorized
the notarial act as clerical and ministerial." An acknowledgement
before a notary public means that the document signer acknowledges
his signature on the document; it is an authentication of the signature
only.56 There is no requirement or duty to determine capacity, intent,
or freedom from undue influence or fraud at the time of
acknowledgement.
This asymmetry in functions undermines the
requirement.
Fourth, in framing the notarized will as a choice, the UPC is
directly confronting a stubbornly troublesome basic formality. One
policy of the UPC is to discover and make effective the intent of the
decedent.
Cases in which a formalistic interpretation of the
statutory formalities has defeated the testator's clear intent-without
the circumstances suggesting any type of fraud-are well known.59

The fact that our judicial agencies are remote from the actual or
fictitious occurrences relied on by the various claimants to the property,
and so must accept second hand information, perhaps ambiguous,

perhaps innocently misleading, perhaps deliberately falsified, seems to
furnish the chief justification for requirements of transfer beyond
evidence of oral statements of intent..

Id.
5 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 225 (1984) ("[A] notary's duties ... are essentially
clerical and ministerial.").
56 See Klint L. Bruno, To Notarize, or Not to Notarize ... Is Not A Question of Judging
Competence or Willingness of Document Signers, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1013, 1021 (1998).
In this regard, consider the format for the notary's clause in section 2-504 of the UPC titled
Self-proved Will affidavit:
State of

County of
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by
testator, and subscribed and sworn to before me by _
, and
witness, this _
day of
.
(Seal)

, the
,

(Signed)
(Official capacity of officer)
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504(a) (1969) (amended 2010).
57 See Klint L. Bruno & Michael L. Closen, Notaries Public and Document Signer

Comprehension:A DangerousMirage in the Desert of NotarialLaw and Practice, 44 S.D. L.
REV. 494, 496 (1999) (determining that a notary public has no duty to ascertain a document
signer's comprehension of the contents of the signed document).
5 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b) (1969) (amended 2010) ("The underlying purposes
and policies of this Code are: . . . (2) to discover and make effective the intent of the decedent
in the distribution of his property.").
59 See Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 613-14 (W.Va. 1998) (Workman, J., dissenting)
('There is absolutely no claim of incapacity or fraud or undue influence, nor any allegation
... [that the decedent] did not consciously, intentionally, and with full legal capacity convey
his property as specified in his will. The challenge to the will is based solely upon the
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Many of those cases arose in the context of the witness requirements,
often the "presence" requirement. 60 The UPC addressed that
difficulty directly by eliminating the presence requirement from its
witness requirement. 6 ' But will execution problems persisted. In
1990, a more global approach was utilized with the addition of the
Harmless-Error Rule. Under this rule, a document that does not
strictly comply with the formalities may, nevertheless, be admitted as
the decedent's will if the proponent proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended the document to be his will. 62
Ten states have adopted some version of the Harmless-Error Rule.
These measures have not eliminated missteps in the witness
requirements or prevented newer concerns from emerging. According
to the UPC comments, one such newer case is the unwitnessed
notarized will, which develops out of two fact patterns. 4 Sometimes
in the confusion of executing multiple estate planning documents at
the same time, gaps in execution occur. A witness may not sign but
the notary does.6 1 In a similar vein, some testators mistakenly
believe (sometimes along with their attorneys) that a notary's
signature is all that is required. 6 In jurisdictions without the
Harmless-Error Rule or a judicial rule of substantial compliance
(which is most jurisdictions), that belief is fatal.67 The UPC response

allegation" of noncompliance with the statutory requirement of signing within the presence
of witnesses at the same time.).
60 Id.; see also In re Groffman, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 733 (P.), 1069 WL 26902.
61 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (1969) (amended 2010).
62 Id. § 2-503 cmt. ("[Tihis new section allows the probate court to excuse a harmless error
in complying with the formal requirements for executing or revoking a will," and by
requiring a burden of proof "by clear and convincing evidence ... Section 2-503 imposes
procedural standards appropriate to the seriousness of the issue."); see John Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil
Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (1987); but see Sherwin, supra note 15,
at 454 (questioning whether the compromise standard of clear and convincing evidence, as
opposed to more than a preponderance or the beyond a reasonable doubt standards, can
work effectively within a rules based system, concluding that "there is no escape ... from
the choice between serious rule enforcement and no rule enforcement."); see also John V.
Orth, Wills Act Formalities:How Much Compliance is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.
J. 73, 80 (2008) (rhetorically questioning the need for any wills formalities, which thereby
leads to the untenable conclusion that the judiciary decides each case "without any guidance
except to 'do the right thing"').
63 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 25, at 184 (listing California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia as adopting a
version of the Harmless-Error Rule).
6 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (1969) (amended 2010) ("Allowing notarized wills as an
optional method of execution addresses cases that have begun to emerge . . . ").
65 See Sisson v. Park Street Baptist Church, (1998) 24 E.T.R. 2d 18, 9-12 (Can. Ont. Gen.
Div.).
6 See Estate of Saueressig, 136 P.3d 201 (Cal. 2006); See In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134
(Mont. 2002).
61 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 cmt. (1969) (amended 2010) ("Under non-UPC law, the will is
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was relatively quick, simple, and unprecedented-make the notarized
will as valid as the witnessed will. Equate the two approaches, right
within the wills formalities section, and thereby provide an easy
method to defeat persistent witness problems altogether by bypassing
witnesses altogether. Was this wise? This option, concededly
motivated by the policy of giving effect to the testator's intent,
significantly undermines the ritual and protective functions. Equally
important, it may lessen the desirability of the UPC as model
legislation. All of these would be regrettable outcomes.
III. FIVE CONCERNS WITH A NOTARIZED WILL OPTION

One reason proffered for the unwitnessed, notarized will is
that many estate planning documents that transfer property either do
not require any witnesses at all, or only require a notary. 68 There is
truth to that. 69 The logical question then is why does a will need
witnesses if these other documents do not. For the simple reason that
a will does not transfer property now, but only at death when the
testator is deceased.
In many of the non-testamentary estate
planning documents that a person will sign, something happens right
now and an independent third party actor is often involved. For
example, a bank account is opened, a life insurance policy is
purchased, a deed is signed and recorded, or a trust is created and
property is transferred into it. Those actions are taken and responded
to, documents are sent back and forth, and the testator will have
current confirmation that the transfers have occurred. There are
transactional and procedural formalities that serve the ritual and
protective functions by giving current notice of ownership or change in
ownership.
A second concern is the confusion that can arise in having the
notary's acknowledgment for purposes of wills requirements. In the
civil law tradition the notary serves a much different function than
the notary public in the U.S. 70 For many U.S. citizens and residents

usually held invalid in such cases . . . .").
6 Lindgren, supra note 49, at 556-57 ("Most property is passed outside of probate .
Most of these non-probate transfers require writing and signature, but not attestation by
witnesses."); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt (1969) (amended 2010) ("Other
uniform acts affecting property or person do not require either attesting witnesses or
notarization."); see, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(2) (2010); UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY
ACT § 105 (2006); UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(f) (2005).
69 And yet at the state level - closer to every day practice of law - some jurisdictions
do
require witnesses, notaries, or both. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/3-3 (2011) (requiring at
least one witness and notarization).
70 Waggoner, supra note 1, at 85.
The American notary does not serve the same function as the notary in

the European civil-law countries. The civil-law notary supervises the
execution of an 'authenticated will,' in which the notary is a quasi-
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with a civil-law heritage, a notary is mistakenly perceived to be the
equivalent of a lawyer. 7 Some states' notary public statutes include a
lengthy and detailed section on notaries who advertise their services
in a language other than English.72 Those ads must disclose in large
type that the notary is not a lawyer and does not provide legal
advice. 73 Having the notarized will option may only continue to
confuse the legitimate boundaries of a notary public. Presumably, a
notary public could now advertise that a testator can finalize a will
before her.
The notarized will causes confusion, and invites
exploitation of legal-cultural differences.
Equally troublesome is the scenario of the internet-form will
or trust that can be filled in, printed out, signed by the testator
without any advice, understanding, or sense of seriousness,74 and then
taken to the notary for acknowledgement. Think of this as the
"whatever" will. I doubt this is the intent of the UPC, but it may be a
practical impact.
More troublesome is the potential for increased fraud and
overreaching in the future. If witnesses are deemed optional, those

judicial officer who determines whether the testator has mental capacity
and is free of duress and undue influence.
Id. This was not always the case. See generally John E. Seth, Notaries in the
American Colonies, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 863 (1999). Some observers of the
American system believe that "many notaries are not competent, diligent, or
honest." Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Notaries Public - Lost in
Cyberspace, or Key Business Professionals of the Future?, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 703, 724 (1997). Two interrelated reasons have been
suggested for the lower esteem of the American notary: "inadequate knowledge of
their responsibilities . . . and poor job performance." Id. at 707. Also there are too
many of them: "Four and a half million notaries is at least 4 million too many.
But even 500,000 are too many as long as they are ill-equipped to do a professional
job." Michael L. Closen, Why Notaries Get Little Respect, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 9, 1995,
at A-23, A-24. For a fuller exposition of the differing roles of notaries and the
difficulties of cross border notarizations, see David S. Allman, et al, Easier Signed
Than Done -Execution, Authentication, and Recording of Documents in Common
Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions,52 ROcKY MTN MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (2006).

See

also James W. Adams, Jr., The Apostille in the 21st Century: International
Document Certification and Verification, 34 IIOUS. J. INT'L. L. 519, 522 (2012)

('The issue of fraudulent documents is of great concern to the energy industry ...
71 See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/3-103(a) ("A notary public shall not ... literally translate from

English into another language terms or titles . . . that implies the person is an attorney. To
illustrate, the word 'notario' is prohibited under this provision.").
72 Id. ("Every notary public who is not an attorney or an accredited immigration
representative who advertises the services of a notary public in a language other English
... shall state: 'I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW IN ILLINOIS
AND MAY NOT GIVE LEGAL ADVICE OR ACCEPT FEES FOR LEGAL ADVICE."').
73 id.
74 A similar issue arose in the context of commercially-prepared preprinted will forms that
were available at stationery stores and elsewhere.
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who prey on vulnerable people may attempt to exploit the wills
process more frequently. It is impossible to know what the ex post
impact of the notarized will option will be, but it is worth
remembering that the real world is dynamic and people - good and
bad - respond to changes.S
Finally, to the extent that the notarized will is seen as too
radical, support for the UPC erodes, and that could jeopardize future
considerations and enactments. The fact that only two states have
enacted the notarized will in five years, and only ten states have
enacted the Harmless-Error Rule in twenty-three years, suggests that
the relevance issue is real.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The problem of errors in execution of wills is real,
longstanding, and frustrating. The UPC purpose and policy of
discerning and giving effect to the decedent's intent is a significant
and correct recalibration of the historic emphasis on statutory acts.
The Harmless-Error Rule is an equitable approach that allows a court
to judge a particular case in light of the wills formalities and, sub
silentio, in light of all the functions those formalities serve. It is
dispiriting that only a handful of states have adopted the rule.
The introduction of a notarized will option creates a
presumption of legitimacy that may not be warranted in light of the
traditional functions that the witness requirements serve, especially
in the scenario of a testator-drafted will. In a rather curious fashion,
the notarized will option undermines the Harmless-Error Rule. It
may be better to place more faith in that rule, even as modified by
enacting legislatures, than to create an unprecedented new option in
the wills formalities. It will be interesting to see if jurisdictions,
especially those without the Harmless-Error Rule and holographic
wills, decide that the notarized will's benefits outweigh the
difficulties.

7 Kelly, supra note 49, at 891 ("Knowing there is no attestation requirement, parties may
have different incentives ex ante. For example, if attestation were abolished, more
wrongdoers might attempt to engage in fraud, thereby reviving the relevance of the
protective function.").

